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MEASURING OPERATIONAL READINESS IN TODAY'S INTER-DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING CYCLE

by

James R. Knapp
CDR, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the
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This failure is manifest in how training is conducted, when training is conducted, and training is reported. Funding constraints limit when and to what degree training is accomplished. Training timelines have constricted as a result of funding, and many separate elements within the battle group have to vie for available time and resources to meet separate required events.

A new set of reports is required to solve these problems. The current report is still required to identify funding requirements to execute the National Military Strategy. However, better reports can be made that combine training and doctrine, levels of training and levels of war, and who the benefit of training is and who reports training accomplishment. Tinkering with existing systems that are not designed to generate the report required by the combatant commander at the tip of the spear is not the answer.

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Introduction

The United States Navy of 2001 has at its core twelve aircraft carriers and ten aircraft carrier wings with which to form carrier battle groups. Carrier battle groups provide a geographic combatant commander a diverse, sustainable, rapidly deployable and easily de-escalatory set of tools while in his area of operations. These warfighting units are subdivided into smaller and smaller tactical elements based on platform and mission. The primary tool within a carrier battle group to project power is the embarked carrier air wing and specifically the strike aircraft in that air wing. The smallest of these units in the air wing, the squadrons, generate the readiness reports that when added together form the readiness picture of the larger units they create. Because the units who report readiness do so with such a narrow focus, their reports create an inaccurate picture of the real capabilities of the larger element they represent. The CINCs currently have no accurate measure of readiness and capability of this basic warfighting unit to project into a crisis situation.

Why should the CINC care about the readiness of a single aircraft carrier and its air wing? The numbers speak for themselves. Short of a Major Theater War (MTW) and Operations Plan (OPLAN) execution, a CINC is unlikely to have more than a single carrier battle group to provide naval air support in his Area of Responsibility (AOR). The United States simply no longer has a great number of these assets remaining. As a result of the battle group's importance to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a geographic combatant command, the readiness of a carrier battle group and its embarked air wing is a highly visible measure of that CINC's capabilities; and resultantly, to the echelons of command responsible for training, equipping, and manning the air wing. Consequently, when an air wing fails to report to an acceptable readiness threshold on its deployment date, a serious transgression has occurred.

Someone has not done their job. The service is responsible for training the air wing for the CINC's use. Therefore, when one of the ten carrier air wings on the planet appears unready to do its mission, the result is a visible effort to focus support to that air wing in order to fix the problem. In recent years, this ugly baby has screamed with increasing regularity. Readiness reporting has become a serious benchmark in a unit's performance. Higher headquarters compare units based on these reports and, in many cases, subconsciously tie these reports with unit commander performance. This situation bears an undue strain on a unit commander to favorably calibrate with past units and similar units in the chain of command. No one wants the kind of visibility afforded to units who fail to report to a required benchmark.

What has caused this problem? Generally, readiness is tied to reporting, and the Navy reports on people, supplies, equipment, and training. Recently, despite the drawdown, the Navy has managed to procure enough and the right mixes of people into deploying units. Intense management of supplies and equipment at a macro-level continues to allow units to progress through the Inter-deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) and deployment. The long pole in the tent when addressing overall readiness issues has been and remains training.

This realization begs some questions. Does the Navy not train right? Is the Navy not capable of preparing a carrier air wing for operational use by a CINC? Has training doctrine not kept pace with the operational realities facing the CINCs? Alternatively, are the CINCs satisfied with the Navy's IDTC process? Perhaps the reporting system is not accurately measuring readiness. As Admiral Prueher maintains, could it be that "an automated system that links tactical readiness data to joint operational and strategic readiness data does not exist."?[1]

Instead of focusing on the symptoms associated with lowered readiness reporting, the focus needs to be on the cause for readiness levels not being reported at a desired level. This is

not the same as looking at funding failures, personnel manning failures, or training event

selection failures. This paper will use carrier air wing training and readiness as an example for a

problem plaguing all the services. The discussion will focus on how the Navy currently reports

its combat readiness, how the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle is structured to achieve the

readiness goals expected of a deploying battle group, and why the current method fails to give

the CINC a clear and accurate picture of the war fighting unit's capabilities. Finally, a

recommendation is made for a readiness report that conveys the relevant information from the

proper source that a CINC can use in determining his own strengths and weaknesses in a crisis

estimate and course of action identification.

Current Readiness Reporting

The Navy's primary method of reporting readiness is via the Status of Resources and

Training System (SORTS). "SORTS is the single, automated reporting system that functions as

the central registry of all operational units in the US Armed Forces."[2] SORTS provides unit

level readiness "in four critical areas: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment serviceability,

and training." Unit readiness is defined as "the ability to provide capabilities required by the

CINCs to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver

the outputs for which it was designed."[3] The report produces the capabilities, or "C rating", in

these four critical areas as well as an overall rating assessment, which can be no higher than the

lowest of any of the four. A readiness level of C-1 is defined as "the unit possesses the required

resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or

designed."[4] C-2 states the unit can do most of the missions assigned. Under C-3, the unit can do

many, but not all, of portions of the missions assigned. Finally, C-4 states the unit needs more

things (people, parts, or training) before it can do its wartime missions.

This system produces a report for the CINCs and the Service Chief on the tactical readiness of a unit. From the definitions in joint doctrine, then, SORTS reports a unit's current ability to enable a CINC to execute his assigned missions. For which of the CINC's assigned missions is SORTS reporting readiness? Does SORTS report readiness for all of them? Or does SORTS only concentrate on the big ones? Because of the top down readiness reporting requirements imposed on the Armed Forces, SORTS is concerned with the capability of a unit to support a CINC fighting a major theater war. Title 10, section 153(a)(3)(d), United States Code, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to establish a uniform system to evaluate the "preparedness of each combatant command" to perform assigned missions with "respect to a war or threat to national security."[5] To comply with this law, the CJCS created the Chairman's Readiness System. This system utilizes the current SORTS system to report "unit readiness as assessed by unit commanders and reported through the Services."[6] Added to this is a readiness input from the CINC's joint perspective to "integrate and synchronize forces".[7] The CINCs may, or may not, use SORTS as tools in the assessment process.[8]

These two primary assessments are used to create the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). For the Services, this review is used to "depict the readiness of major combat and support units that would be tasked to support a warfighting scenario. The goal is to assess current ability to execute the most demanding tasks in the National Military Strategy (NMS)."[9] The Navy is required to depict the readiness at *the battle group level* (emphasis added) to support a JMRR scenario, which generally includes a Major Theater War.[10] Utilizing these products, the JMRR identifies current deficiencies in readiness and capabilities to make a risk assessment to be reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).[11] Finally, the SORTS report

supports not only a measurement of current readiness, but also the "management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces used by the unified commands."[12]

How is training defined in this process? According to joint instruction, "units will report the present level of training of assigned personnel as compared to the standards for a fully trained unit as defined by joint and Service directives."[13] Current training status (T-1, T-2, T-3, or T-4) is based on the number of days of training required, percentage of operationally ready and available air crew, and the percentage of mission-essential tasks trained for available personnel.[14] No other specifics are mentioned, other than that the armed services will direct the number of crews assigned and "will specify a training plan or directive that has mandatory training events to be completed within specified intervals."[15] This leaves the armed service with the role of defining what, when, and how training is conducted.

OPNAVINST 3501.316 lists the critical tasks of the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). These include surveillance and intelligence, command and control, air superiority, maritime superiority, power projection, theater ballistic missile defense, operations in support of the peacetime operations mission, amphibious force operations, and insertion and withdrawal of land-based forces into uncertain and hostile environments.[16] This is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) definition of Title 10 tasking to "organize, train, and equip Navy forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea."[17] The CNO then tasks the Commanders in Chief, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleet to "provide unified combatant commanders with organized, trained, and equipped forces in accordance with this instruction." They are also to provide input to the combatant commanders to ensure that CVBG capabilities are integrated into the Commander in Chief's Joint Mission Essential Task Lists" (JMETL).[18] Finally, the Naval Doctrine Command is tasked to "develop doctrine for forward presence

operations including initial and sustained crises response measures and the initial phases of combat operations centered on the capabilities available in one or more CVBGs."[19] Doctrine has been developed by the Naval Warfare Development Command with the aid of various fleet subject matter experts and various warfighting staffs. Commands under the CINCs of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets accomplish the training of carrier battle groups and carrier air wings.

The Type Commanders (TYCOM) of Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific Fleets develop single training and readiness matrices for units under their command to define the training standards to be utilized in SORTS reporting. "The events in these matrices are designed to demonstrate proficiency in the skills required to execute the mission tasks listed in the Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operating Environment (ROC/POE) for each community. The events are also linked to tasks in the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL)."[20] ROC/POE, UNTLs, prioritized primary mission areas, IDTC flow, and major training evolutions are the basis for events listed in the Training and Readiness instruction.[21] Aircrew experience determines currency and length of qualifications. The matrix is then developed from two fundaments, required training and periodicity. The end result of this matrix is the identification of how often what type events are required to achieve a desired training level in a unit. A summation will then identify what funding level is required, by unit, to achieve a desired training level. This includes flying hour funds, amount and time of range support, and ordnance non-combat expenditure allowance (NCEA). Some consideration is given to non-training flight time inherent in the system. This includes maintenance flights and support as adversaries to achieve required training needed in other events.

Ergo, the genesis of the current readiness reporting system is a congressional mandate to report on the military's ability to conduct the National Military Strategy. The service chiefs,

responsible for training and equipping forces to combatant commanders, develop the doctrine that then supports the training required to meet the requirements of the combatant commander. Type commanders develop the matrices that should adequately prepare units to execute doctrine in support of the NMS. Collectively, all these matrices inform the Service Chief how much a desired level of training costs from year to year.

The above discussion has explained how reporting of readiness has evolved. With this evolution has been a concurrent evolution in how and for what the Navy trains. If this process is synergistic, the IDTC should be a roadmap to how training accomplishes the "whats" in doctrine. Ultimately, coactions are required between these three; how we train, for what we train, and how that training is reported. A disconnect between any of the three will distort the final output of measured readiness.

The Inter-Deployment Training Cycle

The Type Commanders are responsible to ensure the required training of aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings. The goal of the training cycle is to provide "battle group commanders, carrier commanding officers and air wing commanders with well-trained air wings capable of immediate integration into a combat ready carrier battle group."[22] How does the TYCOM develop such a program? The process has developed into a building block approach to achieving increasingly more complex operational capability in both scope of unit involvement and complexity of the individual events. Each unit (squadron level) must learn to work within itself. Then individual squadrons integrate with the other squadrons in the air wing. The air wing unit then learns to coalesce with the carrier to conduct routine day and night operations while embarked. The ship/air wing unit then joins the battle group for inclusion into the

Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept of operations. Finally, joint and fleet operations are conducted as a battle group unit prior to deployment.

The Basic Training Phase is the first period from the end of deployment through the first at-sea period of the air wing and its aircraft carrier, called Tailored Ships Training Availabilities (TSTA). As mentioned, this phase assumes that "personnel changes, transfer and maintenance of aircraft and assets, formal schooling, and coordination and finalization of future training plan activities during this time will generally result in lower than normal readiness levels."[23] In spite of such pitfalls, two major training events do occur in the Basic Training Phase. The first involves squadron participation in a type wing sponsored Advanced Readiness Program (ARP). This course focuses on the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) based on unit mission. The second major event is the first at-sea period of the air wing and carrier. This TSTA at-sea period, nominally fifteen days in length, is designed to produce an air wing and carrier capable of basic shipboard operations, to include air refueling, damage control training, anti-terrorism training, and completion of basic carrier qualification landings.[24] Although this period ends with an evaluation from the Type Commander, the event is not driven by any higher headquarters tasking. Thus, the time available for training to the carrier and air wing during this period is at their discretion. As will be shown, this is the last time such discretion is available.

"After completion of TSTA, training evolutions will continue to build on carrier air wing operational readiness in order to progress into battle group (BG) operations."[25] This intermediate phase has two major events for the air wing. The first, the Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), is a nominal twenty-eight day at-sea period conducted by the respective training Carrier Battle Group (CCG) staffs, CCG-1 and CCG-2. The purpose of this at-sea period is to train the deploying carrier battle group staff for the expected operational environment of

deployment. This is also the first time the units comprising the deploying battle group have worked together. Prior to the at-sea period, all units within the battle group submit required unit training events necessary to achieve their desired training and readiness matrix standard. The training carrier group staff develops a schedule of events (SOE) based on their planned training goals and, where available, individual unit training requirements. An SOE is developed for the first twenty-five days of the at-sea period focusing on unit level integration into the whole of the battle group. The battle group learn elements of battle group defense, power projection, and a host of other requirements in the middle. At the end of this period, the carrier group staff conducts a three day scenario based graduation exercise. The battle group must transit to a point, establish air and maritime superiority, then conduct offensive operations as the scenario demands. This exercise "will determine the level of the ship/air wing operational readiness and potential for integration into battle group operations."[26]

The other major event in the intermediate phase is the air wing's deployment to Naval Air Station Fallon for four weeks of strike warfare training. The Naval Strike Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) conducts this training for the air wing. Through this unity of effort, all air wings receive the same syllabus. Again, the program utilizes a building block approach, with the first week consisting of smaller elements exercising basic skills. The second week focuses on contingency operations, with available assets from Special Forces (particularly Navy Special Forces), Air Force, and Marines integrated as much as possible. The final week is a scenario-driven campaign, requiring the development of a Master Air Attack Plan and campaign plan, and multiple strikes to demonstrate power projection over an extended period of time. NSAWC evaluates the air wing as a unit to conduct power projection in a variety of environments.

At the conclusion of the intermediate phase, the battle group consolidates as a unit and is ready for increasingly complex integration in the advanced phase of training. Two at-sea periods, each about eleven days in length, comprise the advanced phase. The first is a Fleet Exercise (FLEETEX) which demonstrates the battle group's ability to conduct coordinated offensive and defensive tasks for the battle group commander. The last event is a Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX), again a scenario driven event conducted by the numbered fleet commander, either Second or Third. Combining elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked in an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), a separate Joint Task Force Commander and staff, and Air Force units, this exercise integrates the battle group with other services. The goal is to demonstrate concurrent coordination with the ARG for protection and offensive close air support, Air Tasking Order (ATO) promulgation and execution, and interaction with air force planners and platforms. The battle group participates in a full range of operations; hostile transits, Air Defense Exercises (ADEX), Air Exclusion Zone (AEZ) enforcement, Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO), Non-combat Evacuation Operations (NEO), and joint power projection operations. This exercise completes the battle group's training prior to deployment.

None of this training occurs in a vacuum respecting doctrine. For example, NSAWC is one of the Centers of Excellence chosen by the Naval Warfare Development Command to develop measures to assess successful task completion in the UNTL. The training Carrier Groups and numbered Fleet staffs all use the measures contained in the UNTL when designing their respective exercises. The training in all phases is exponentially more standardized than was the case ten years ago. From air wing to air wing and battle group to battle group, adherence to emerging doctrine has built a standardized IDTC.

A thirty to forty-five day stand down period follows the IDTC to allow for leave periods and maintenance of equipment prior to deployment. "The TYCOM training goal is to have each air wing/squadron/det at C-1 (C-2) minimum in training (SORTS CRTNG) on deployment date."[27] This goal is difficult to achieve, and in some ways counterproductive to the readiness of the deploying unit, the carrier battle group. Disconnects between how we train, and who reports what for readiness creates friction during the training process and provides an incomplete picture to the operational commander.

Problems in Training

In a world of unconstrained resources, the best method to achieve large unit cohesion would be to keep smaller units at a high level of readiness at all times. The high level of core competencies already established would simplify the process of unit integration. Historically, other than protracted war, this has rarely been the case. Instead, with the constrained resources available to the Navy, the training cycle is built around battle group deployment dates, and the training moves as near as possible to that point. Units not involved in deployment or deployment preparation are relegated to support of those units that are involved in such activities. These units are sacrificed to meet the needs of those who are involved in deployment activities. This tiered system of readiness is not the most desirable, but does have the advantage of some cost effectiveness and predictability.

Because of these financial constraints, training is just-in-time. Every second of available at-sea time or flight time is precious to all involved. Units in the post-deployment to pre-IDTC phase are expected to be at very low readiness level. Equipment and parts are stripped from them to support others. They have a very low funding line for flying or at-sea periods. Periodicity between training events increases well beyond the training standards. Personnel

billets are gapped as their overall priority for manning decreases. These constraints, both fiscal and personnel, also constrains the type and timing of training. Combining the just-in-time training concept and limitation of resources produces competition amongst the various units for scarce training time and resources.

The John C. Stennis Battle Group had a normal IDTC in 1999. Working back from a deployment date of January 7, 2000, the battle group began its IDTC with the TSTA at-sea period on July 12, 1999. From this point until the end of the last at-sea period, 134 days were available. Of these 134 days, the air wing spent 16 underway during TSTA, 20 underway for COMPTUEX, 26 in Fallon for air wing training, 11 underway for FLEETEX, 11 underway for JTFEX, seven days in-port, and three days in transit. Between these two at-sea periods (TSTA and COMPTUEX were combined as were FLEETEX and JTFEX) and one detachment, squadron units had 40 days remaining to manage leave periods, maintenance, preparation for at-sea periods, and training.[28] Again, funding constraints lead to just-in-time training. Just-in-time training precludes the squadron's ability to influence their own training during the majority of the IDTC.

The other units in the battle group are no better off. As a result, the individual unit fights for the training time and assets available during these periods in order to achieve their individual training requirements. Each ship in the battle group needs air wing support for unit training. The battle group staff needs ship and air wing support to achieve battle group and staff training. Very rarely are these separately derived required events mutually beneficial. This schedule leads to increased overhead costs. For instance, the battle group must learn to protect itself. It conducts ADEXs to hone their ability in command and control to protect the group. Because individual units have not worked together before, the BG requires multiple ADEXs for

proficiency. The BG schedules multiple exercises in a very short period of time. The available

training qualifications to a fighter aircrew are limited, and they have a two or three month

periodicity. Thus, after the first one or two of these exercises, no training points are available to

the squadrons involved. This does not make the training any less vital, but SORTS shows no

increase in readiness even though the battle group's ability to protect itself has increased. When

devising flight hour funding, a "20% overhead is allowed based on 5% Post Maintenance Check

Flights and 15% operational hours where no T&R points are awarded."[29] During the Stennis

Battle Group's JTFEX, the fighter squadrons flew between 46% and 56% of all their sorties in

Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions in support of the battle group and JTF Commander.[30]

The majority of these events created no reportable increase in readiness for the squadrons.

Again, this exercise was required at the battle group level, but just-in-time training does not

translate into SORTS.

The results of the current IDTC are twofold. First, unit proficiency is low and integration

is slow early in the IDTC. Second, later in the IDTC, when units do have the right personnel,

equipment and budget to train, their training priorities are overwhelmed by larger unit

requirements that do not translate into the training matrices of the individual units. Thus, a

disconnect exists between how the Navy trains and how the Navy reports its training.

Problems With Readiness Reporting

SORTS is a tool ill suited to quantify readiness at the operational level. Since the units

reporting are tactical in size, tactical terminology defines their training standards. For instance,

the F/A-18 training matrix has taken all the tasks expected to be accomplished by this platform

and laid them out in 66 events. These tasks are defined and listed by referencing tactical level

tasks (NTA) as defined in the UNTL.[31] Though this may sound like too few; however, a 20

sortie per aircrew month is above the 100% funding line. With most events falling in a one, two, or three month periodicity window, this list remains robust. The matrix remains a bare minimum to accomplish all the expected functions listed in the unit's ROC/POE and primary mission areas. The problem is the inability to transfer these tasks into the training environment of the larger unit. The larger unit focuses on interoperability of the lesser units that make it up. This requirement is not accounted for in the unit's training matrix. The ADEX example previously addressed is applicable. Another example is the battle group's requirement to operate jointly during JTFEX. The tactical unit has no requirement for joint integration, nor should it. Tactical tasks do not involve jointness. Of the 66 events in the F-18 matrix, one requires a joint interface, tanking from a U.S. Air Force KC-135.[32] As a consequence, participation in many training events by a unit does not translate in SORTS as an increase in readiness.

This leads to the second problem in readiness reporting. The unit required to report readiness is simply not in the best position to effect readiness. As discussed earlier, the unit commander often does not have the resources to train when he has the time to train and the authority to dictate training. When the resources are provided to him, support of higher unit training requirements is the primary mission. Appendix A provides a visual depiction of this concept. This creates tension in the training process. The units determining the readiness of the battle group chase events that do not fold into the requirements of the larger whole. One of two things happens as a result. The tactical unit responsible for reporting can play along without complaint. The unit can then honestly report its readiness based on the training matrix, or the unit can massage its readiness data to conform to higher headquarters expectations. Neither event is desired. The other possibility is for the entire exercise to shift focus away from the operational level, and return focus to the tactical training requirements of the individual units,

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regardless of whether this switch still achieves the exercise's stated goal. Again, this event is also not favored.

Recommendations

Accurate reporting to an operational commander of a unit's readiness requires matching the training's target with the report. During an Advanced Readiness Program, the squadron unit is training. During TSTA, portions of COMPTUEX, and all of Fallon air wing detachment, the air wing unit is training. During the final portion of COMPTUEX, and all of FLEETEX and JTFEX, the battle group unit is training. Currently, the method to do this is informal, nonstandard, and carries no weight when compared to SORTS. The need to change the focus is important to note. After all, a squadron does not fly by itself on deployment. The helicopters launch and provide plane guard duty, the tankers launch and provide airborne fuel, the E-2 provides command and control, and finally the other aircraft launch to perform offensive or defensive missions as required. The air wing flies as a unit, and the air wing is ready as a unit. Yet, how is this assessment made known to the operational commander? Officially, SORTS from the tactical unit is by far the most watched. This perspective does not show the dynamics of unit interplay into the larger whole. For example, an F-18 squadron is short three critical ordnance personnel. This shortage drives the unit to a C-3 SORTS level because these three people are needed by the squadron to load bombs in time of war. Does this mean the squadron cannot load bombs? No, the air wing unit will combine all the ordnance personnel assets at its disposal to ensure all aircraft in the air wing are loaded to carry out their mission. Yet, air wing SORTS reports have no mechanism to depict this.

The first recommendation is not to tinker with SORTS. SORTS performs its task as designed, and no more. SORTS displays to the Service Chief current readiness held against a

high standard, a major theater war. SORTS shows how much fuel, how many planes, how much

equipment, how many bombs, and how much time is required to train a unit to a given level of

readiness. Again, these high standards are benchmarks that need to be expressed to those who

fund the armed services. SORTS cannot be diluted to serve an alternate purpose. SORTS should

continue, but needs to lose the aura of a report card. The "G" in SORTS need to be added into

the report, ensuring that everyone knows it is a Global Status of Resources and Training System.

The second recommendation is not to tinker with the training. The training is standard,

applied to doctrine and expected operational capabilities. The IDTC packs a training punch into

as small a bag as possible. The only shortcoming currently is in joint training. Again, because

of resource constraints, only a small window of opportunity exists where a battle group is

sufficiently ready to conduct joint operations. Tying this window with other services is a

problem beyond the scope of this paper.

The third recommendation is to create new reports that address higher levels of training

and readiness. Two new reports are required at the end of each major event in the IDTC. The

first report would be a training report from the event coordinator, NSAWC, a type wing, a

training carrier group, or a numbered fleet staff. The basis for this report would be the level of

training planned. The report would then use the appropriate level of tasks from the UNTL to

depict the training goal. The report should apply accepted measures of successful completion of

these tasks to the unit evaluated. The level of standardization in the major training events allows

this to happen. The report should not report what was done, but how well it was done. A

concurrent readiness report would follow from the unit evaluated. This report would tie in

current capabilities as depicted in the training report with current manning, equipment, and parts

to accomplish the mission as required by the next superior in the chain of command. At the

completion of the readiness program, the report would be from the type wing and the squadron. At the end of TSTA, the report would be from the Air Wing Commander and the Carrier Commander addressing how the air wing and ship are currently manned, and collectively their demonstrated capabilities. Following COMPTUEX, the training Carrier Group would publish a readiness report on the battle group's Composite Warfare Commander's ability to function together. The BG Commander would then combine that report with his own concerns of manning and equipment at that stage in the cycle. NSAWC and the air wing commander would follow after the air wing detachment. Following JTFEX, the numbered Fleet Commander should report on the readiness of the battle group to conduct joint and combined operations for a geographic CINC. Aside from the uncommon restraints of funding, ranges, joint assets, and others beyond the control of those involved with the exercises, these reports would allow a CINC the ability to compare the performance of one battle group to another throughout the IDTC. Reporting to the CINC how well a universally accepted training program was accomplished, vice explaining what or how much training was accomplished, is the best measure of readiness to a CINC that can be produced.

Conclusion

Because resources prevent constant high levels of readiness, training is conducted quickly as near to deployment as possible. The training and readiness matrices cannot take available training time into account when devising the requirements to fight and win a war. The mismatch between fiscal realities of training and how the Navy reports readiness causes readiness levels to be reported at a lower level than desired or expected. SORTS is doing the job it was designed to do. By going to the smallest common denominator, the Service Chief has an accurate picture of

readiness for the worst case, and an accurate tool to gauge the cost of supporting the National

Military Strategy. SORTS is a valuable tool that needs not be tampered with.

To give the CINC an accurate picture of friendly strengths and weaknesses in his Area of

Responsibility, new reports are required that combine operational tasks with the training process

that is there in the real world. Only by focusing on these higher levels of war that are the focus

of the majority of training can the CINC truly be assured that the tasking he gives the battle

group can be feasibly executed during the next crisis.

This slide depicts a notional IDTC. As you move through the IDTC, different units exert control over a reporting unit's time and resources. The unit commander's ability to affect training is highest prior to the start of the IDTC, when funding is lowest and readiness levels are not important. The TYCOM controls equipment, parts, and funding for the majority of the period, and controls some aspects of the training during the IDTC as well. The Exercise Coordinators are varied, with the training Carrier Group staff, the numbered Fleet Commanders, and the Naval Strike Air Warfare Center all playing roles depending on the IDTC event.

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
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[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System, CJCS Guide 3401A (Washington, DC: 31 July 1997), 5.

[3] Ibid, A-1.

[4] Ibid, 6.

[5] Ibid, 9.

[6] Ibid, 10.

[7] Ibid, 9.

[8] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman's Readiness System, CJCSI 3401.01B CH-1 (Washington, DC: 19 June 2000), D-7.

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[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman's Readiness System, D-4.

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[12] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), CJCSM 3150.02 (Washington, DC: 15 April 2000), A-8.

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[14] Ibid, C-8.

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[17] Ibid, 1.

[18] Ibid, 2.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Navy Department, <u>Squadron Training and Readiness</u>, CNAPINST 3500.67E (San Diego, CA: 24 March 2000), 2.

[21] Ibid, 1-1.

[22] Navy Department, <u>Air Wing Turnaround Training Requirements and Readiness Standards</u>, CNAPINST 3500.60B (San Diego, CA: 13 April 1994), 1.

[23] Ibid, 4.

[24] Ibid, 5.

[25] Ibid, 6.

[26] Ibid, 8.

[27] Navy Department, <u>CNAPINST 3500.67E</u>, 3.

[28] Carrier Air Wing Nine, <u>CVW-9 Turnaround Training Plan</u>, (Unpublished Operations Department Memorandum, Lemoore. CA: 19 March 2001).

[29] Navy Department, <u>CNAPINST 3500.67E</u>, Encl. 24.

[30] Carrier Air Wing Nine, <u>JTFEX BP Sortie Breakdown</u>, (Unpublished Operations Department Memorandum, Lemoore, CA: 1999).

[31] Navy Department, <u>Universal Naval Task List</u>, OPNAVINST 3500.38 (Washington, DC: 30 September 1996).

[32] Navy Department, <u>Squadron Training and Readiness</u>, 7-10 - 7-14.

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